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Connecting the Dots: Implicit Commonalities 
Among Cultural Morphogenesis, Structuration, 
and Market Economics 
Stephen D. Cooper 
Perhaps the central foundational issue of our time is the relationship 
of human agency and social structure. If human actors are 
constrained by the rules and rhetoric of the social system, how is it 
that those actors can yet bring about radical change in that social 
system? A similar puzzle exists in economics: how is it that individual 
transactions both maintain and transform the marketplace? This 
paper begins to identify common ground implicit in the work of 
Margaret Archer, Anthony Giddens, and Friedrich Hayek. 
Emergence, change, reproduction, time, agency, power, and 
knowledge are themes which can be read in these scholars' theories of 
cultural morphogenesis, structuration, and market economics. 
Perhaps the central foundational issue of our time is the 
relationship of human agency and social structure. If human actors are 
constrained by the rules and rhetoric of the social system, how is it that 
those actors can yet bring about radical change in that social system? 
A similar puzzle exists in economics: how is it that individual 
transactions both maintain and transform the marketplace? This paper 
begins to identify common ground in particular theories of social 
structure and market economics. 
The works of Margaret Archer (1995, 1996), Anthony Giddens 
(1986, 1990), and Friedrich Hayek (1956) are not conventionally 
thought to be related, much less to be compatible. Archer aims a good 
deal of criticism at both collectivist and individualist conceptions of 
human agents. Giddens seems most concerned with critiques of 
functionalism and postmodemism. Hayek, one of the major figures in 
Austrian economics, seems to garner little scholarly attention in 
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sociological or communication circles despite his evident concern for 
the relationship of social structures and human behaviors. 
This paper begins to explore implicit commonalities in these 
scholars' theories of cultural morphogenesis, structuration, and market 
economics. Inherently, this is an exercise in "thinking out of the box" 
and is necessarily selective, rather than comprehensive, in considering 
those theories. Its reading of those theories will stray somewhat 
beyond their own terms. The hope is that despite what initially 
appears to be incommensurability among the theories, there may be 
conceptual synergy possible in even a rude form of synthesis. While 
this paper is not a rhetorical analysis in itself, rhetoric plays an 
important role in cultural and structural dynamics-· both change and 
reproduction. For that reason, it may be useful to link 
cultural/structural dynamics to public decision making, with their 
connection to rhetoric taken as a given. This paper is a first step in 
that direction. 
The Three Theories, In Brief 
It will be useful to first touch on particular concepts in the 
three theories by themselves, then proceed to identify common ideas 
implicit in then1. Again, this treatment is selective, rather than 
comprehensive. 
Cultural Morphogenesis 
Margaret Archer's work on cultural morphogenesis (1995, 
1996) is the most recent of the theories considered here. Her 
dissatisfaction with earlier foundational theories of social life lies in 
what she terms the "contlation" of structure and agency ( 1995). In 
simplest terms, individualism reduced structure to a dependent 
variable of agency, while collectivism reduced agency to a dependent 
variable of structure. Both neglected culture as a variable. A central 
insight of Archer's work, then, is that social theory must recognize the 
interplay among structure, culture, and agency for that theory to have 
reasonable explanatory power. 
Another insight is the role of time in structural dynamics. 
Structure, culture, and agency all exhibit their own morphogenetic 
cycles of conditioning (e.g., acculturation or reproduction), interaction 
(e.g., resistance, contestation), and elaboration (e.g., emergence). 
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These cycles are related but not synchronized; the cycles are also 
iterative, which is to say that the starting point of one cycle is the 
terminal state of another. Comprehensive social analysis, then, must 
also take into account the morphogenetic/morphostatic cycles of these 
three variables. 
Structuration 
Anthony Giddens' structuration theory (1986) likewise avoids 
conceptualizing social institutions as independent variables. A key 
notion in Giddens is that those social institutions are not brought into 
existence by human actors, yet are inevitably recreated by the 
activities of human actors. This "duality" of structure is apparent in 
the way the production of social activity simultaneously reproduces 
the social contexts preserved as memory in human agents. Agents are 
"knowledgeable" in the sense that they know how to act in a practical, 
day-to-day sense, even if they do not possess the same knowledge at a 
level of discursive consciousness. 
In Giddens' sense, structure consists of rules and resources 
involved in this ongoing production and reproduction. Rules include 
both normatives and codes of signification. Resources include the 
ability to coordinate the activities of humans, and control over material 
goods. What most distinguishes Giddens's theory from earlier 
functionalist approaches is the notion that structure (as collections of 
rules and resources) exists out of time and space, while the social 
system consists of the regularities of human activity, reproduced 
across time and space. This accounts for the duality of structure, and 
the recursive quality of day-to-day human activity. 
Free Market Economics 
Perhaps the best-known work of Friedrich A. Hayek is The 
Road to Serfdom (1956). While this book has in recent years gained 
renewed attention for its critique of collectivist political ideology, of 
interest here is its connection between the properties of the social 
system and the agency of the human actors who operate within it. 
A fundamental insight of Hayek's work is that a government 
which is expansive in its exercise of power tends, over time, to 
become tyrannical; this is the essence of Hayek's critique of socialist 
ideology. For our purposes here, it is useful to translate this 
relationship in the following way: a social system which tends to 
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extend its control over individuals' activities tends to diminish those 
individuals' agency. Thus, Hayek saw the power of the system and 
the power of the individual human agent to stand in fundamental 
opposition to each other, and in an inverse relationship to each other. 
Another insight relevant to this paper is what Hayek and other 
Austrian economists referred to as the "knowledge problem." In brief, 
managed economies tend to operate in suboptimal states because it is 
impossible for the managers to obtain necessary information to make 
choices which maximize value throughout the system. By contrast, 
market economies are characterized by decentralized decision-making 
based on localized information about preferences and conditions. 
Here, too, we can see the structure/agency question in another guise: 
to the extent that the social system operates as an entity in itself, how 
can it maximize the value-not just economic, but aesthetic, 
emotional, or relational, as well-available to the human agents 
operating within it? 
Signature Concepts: The core concepts which distinguish cultural 
morphogenesis, structuration, and market economics can be 
summarized briefly. 
Archer morphogenesis: separate, but 
interrelated, change cycles in 
structure, agency, and cui ture 
Giddens duality of structure: simultaneously 
a constraint and enabler of human 
agency 
Hayek threat to agency: attempts to manage 
social system tend to diminish 
individual freedom 
Implicit Commonalities 
Their obvious dissimilarities notwithstanding, it is possible to 
tease out a number of common themes among these theories. For the 
most part, these are not the terms used by Archer, Giddens, or Hayek; 
rather, they are readings of those theories with an eye for 
commonalities implicit in their conceptions of agency and structure. 
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Emergence 
In all three theories, there is some sense that important features 
of the social system emerge through human interactions in the context 
of the social system. Archer uses the term explicitly, in categorizing 
her theory as "emergentist." Giddens and Hayek do not invoke the 
term themselves, but it seems reasonable to read this theme in their 
theories. In structuration, it is the activity of humans which give rise 
to social systems. In Hayek, the transactions among humans create 
value and thereby shape the social system. 
Archer structure emergent through 
structural elaboration ( 1995, 
p. 193) 
Giddens social systems emergent 
through "situated activities 
of human agents" (1986, p. 
25) 
Hayek value emergent in a free 
market 
Change/Reproduction 
Archer's explanation of change and reproduction in structure is 
by far the most elaborate. Structure, culture, and agency are separate 
variables, each with a cycle consisting of conditioning, interaction, and 
elaboration. The interrelationships of these three variables create 
conditions of change or reproduction. 
Curiously, structuration theory in itself seems to neglect this 
dimension, other than to note that intentional (i.e., rational) actions 
often have unintended (i.e., irrational) consequences (1986, p. 11-14 ). 
Giddens's notion of radicalized modernity (1990, p. 53) provides more 
detail: change is supported by "disembedding mechanisms" (i.e., 
social relationships can span large distances of time and space) and a 
"reflexive appropriation of knowledge" (i.e., the reproduction of social 
relations is greatly affected by the awareness of the social relations). 
In Hayek's work, positive change is a casualty of managed 
social structures. Once a power to coordinate the activities of humans 
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has been instantiated (what Giddens refers to as an "authoritative 
resource"), that power tends to become unresponsive to the needs and 
preferences of those humans. We can read into Hayek's discussion of 
tyranny a correlation between this kind of power and the reproduction 
of social structure. 
Archer interlocked cycles in structure, 
culture, and agency; combinations 
favoring change (morphogenesis) 
and reproduction (mo__!l?_hostasis) 
Giddens unintended consequences of 
intentional action; radicalized 
modernity 
Hayek managed social structure inhibits 
positive change 
Driving Force Behind Change 
For Archer and Giddens, change seems strongly related to 
limitations on human rationality. In cultural morphogenesis, 
contradictions in the cultural system figure heavily in change. In 
structuration, intentional action often has unintended consequences, 
and the action may be taken within conditions unacknowledged by the 
actors. In individualist conceptions of agency, such as Hayek's, self-
interested activity provides ongoing feedback into the social system. 
Archer contradictions in cultural system 
(or in social system) 
Giddens unintended consequences of 
action; unacknowledged 
conditions of action 
Hayek self-interest in situation of 
__Qersonal freedom 
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Time 
Time is a key element in Archer's theory of morphogenesis. 
The conditioning, interaction, and elaboration stages of the 
morphogenetic cycle occur in time; conditioning and interaction 
overlap, as do interaction and elaboration. Another way time figures 
in Archer's work is the observation that neither transformation nor 
reproduction is equally possible at all historical times. 
Time figures heavily in Giddens's work, also, but in a different 
sense. Time-space constrains human agency, but not structure-a 
condition which Giddens refers to a "time-space distantiation." While 
day-to-day life is reversible (in the sense that as individuals we can 
often undo what we did), the lifetime of the body is irreversible. 
Social institutions exist in time, also, but usually a much longer time 
frame than the individual human. 
For Hayek, the stability of social rules over time is an 
important condition for humans to be able to make intelligent choices 
for their actions. In this sense, time is related to knowledge as a factor 
in human agency. Moreover, a connection can be made here to 
Giddens's concept of the human as a knowledgeable agent with regard 
to practical (day-to-day) consciousness. 
Archer periodization of change/stasis; 
possibility of transformation not 
equal at all times 
Giddens time-space is constraint on agency; 
reversible time of day-to-day life; 
irreversible time of the body; long 
duration of institutions 
Hayek rules must be knowable and 
consistent over time for individuals 
to plan their activities 
Power 
The concept of power is central to all three theories, although 
the conception in each is distinct. In Archer, power plays a major role 
in a tension between morphogenesis and morphostasis. Giddens notes 
that power is an essential ingredient in any meaningful idea of human 
agency; put simply, there cannot be agency without an ability to 
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influence the course of day-to-day life. As an economist, Hayek's 
concern is that control over the economy is not contained simply to the 
economic transactions individual might choose to engage in, but 
constitutes a far-reaching power over much of social life. 
Archer two kinds of power: 
transformational and reproductive 
Giddens inherent in being an agent~ not 
restricted to sectional interests, and 
not necessarily oppressive 
Hayek control over economic activity 
confers broad power over human 
action 
Constraint on Agency 
Giddens's conception of structure as a duality is an explicit 
statement of a constraint on agency. He takes pains to note that, as a 
duality, structure simultaneously constrains and enables the actions 
individual humans might take; paradoxically, it does this by virtue of 
its time-space distanciation (see 1986, p. 170 ff.). Archer identifies 
structural and cultural conditioning as analytically distinct constraints 
on human agency (1995, p. 195 ff.); in short, humans at the present 
time are constrained by the outcomes of prior morphogenetic cycles. 
For Hayek, the greatest constraint on agency is collectivist thinking 
and action; in short, purposefully coordinated activity stands in a 
fundamental opposition to individual action (see 1956, p. 32 ff.). 
These positions may at first glance appear incommensurate, yet in 
each there is some hint that the individual human is in some important 
way constrained by the group. 
Archer cultural and structural 
conditioning 
Giddens structure (organized rules and 
resources, out of time/space) 
Hayek collectivism, as an ideology 
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Threat to Agency 
For all three theories, the chief threat to agency would thus 
seem to be control: control over the cultural system, control over 
structure, or control over transactions. 
Archer control over culture (beliefs & 
practices) 
Giddens control over structure (rules & 
resources) 
Hayek control over transactions (voluntary 
economic activity) 
Knowledge 
This, too, is a concept central to all three theories, yet it plays a 
markedly different role in each. In cultural morphogenesis. the 
cultural system is bounded by the total set of things which can be 
made sense of or given voice to at any given time. In structuration, 
agents know how to "get along in the world" far better than they know 
how to articulate the conditions in which they act. In Hayek's theory, 
the "knowledge problem" is the fatal flaw of central planning: it is 
impossible for the planners to optimize the system because it is 
impossible for the knowledge to be centralized. 
Archer at any given time, the cultural 
system is bounded by the stock of 
knowledge 
Giddens knowledgeability of agents is mainly 
in practical, rather than discursive, 
consciousness 
Hayek managed structure suboptimal 
because necessary information 
cannot be centralized 
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Dynamic Relationship of Individual and Society 
Ali three theories recognize some level of impact of the individual 
human on society as a whole. In Archer's theory, this effect operates 
through the cultural system. In Giddens, action-which is both 
constrained and enabled by structure--both reproduces and transforms 
structure. In Hayek, the accumulation of individual, self-interested 
acts is, in some sense, social capital upon which future acts can draw. 
Archer individual acts shaped by cultural 
conditioning, and have potential 
to impact cultural elaboration 
Giddens individual simultaneously 
constrained and enabled by 
structure 
Hayek individual acts accumulate into 
social capital 
Implications for the Rhetoric of Policy 
It may be useful to distill these commonalities into a few 
general statements with implications for policy discussions. 
• Human agency and social objects are symbiotic. 
Neither concept makes much analytical sense without the other-or 
much real world sense, either. As Giddens points out, social structure 
is the medium for human agency. As Archer points out, interaction is 
a crucial phase of the morphogenetic cycle-at least in part because it 
is through interaction that the "internal and necessary logical relations 
between components of the cultural system" ( 1995, pp. 168-169) can 
be maintained or restored. 
• Social objects emerge through the exercise of human agency, but 
are manageable only to a limited extent. 
As Giddens put it, "human history is created by intentional activities, 
but is not an intended project; it persistently eludes efforts to bring it 
under conscious direction" (1986, p. 27). The knowledge problem 
identified by Hayek pertains here, also. Efforts to manage social 
structure require a level of reduction in information about that 
structure that precludes the success of the effort. The morphogenetic 
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cycle Archer described is clearly a process of negotiation or 
accommodation more than conscious direction. 
• Centralization of control over human activity is problematic. 
Hayek's warning about this danger is explicit: agency (as individual 
freedom) and institutional power are fundamentally opposed to each 
other. There is a sense of this in Giddens, too, when he describes 
nation-states as self-interested "actors" ( 1990, p. 72) in themselves. 
e Social life may be analyzable, but it cannot be reduced to simple, 
deterministic relationships. 
Archer's critique of earlier collectivist and individualist social theory 
drives home the essential point that social life is complex, dynamic, 
and multidimensional. Giddens seems to have been wrestling with the 
same issue when he formulated stn1cture as a "duality" rather than a 
dualism. And implicit in Hayek is a warning against an intellectual 
smugness that anyone understands social life well enough to be able to 
direct it. 
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